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Abstract
The formal analysis of normative systems as initiated by Alchourrón and Bulygin can be com-
plemented by the analysis of normative positions as pursued by Kanger, Lindahl, Sergot and Jones.
The paper is a step towards integrating the two approaches within an algebraic theory of so-called
Boolean quasi-orderings (Bqo’s). In the general Bqo theory presented, a number of theoretical tools
are introduced and elucidated by theorems, in particular those of fragment, connection, coupling
and pair coupling. Condition implication structures (cis’s) are models of the Bqo theory used for
the representation of normative systems. A system of normative positions is introduced as a special
kind of cis. The final section is devoted to an example exhibiting a legal mini-system where a cis of
normative positions (np-cis) is joined to a descriptive cis.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Normative systems
In their well-known book Normative Systems [1], Carlos E. Alchourrón and Eugenio
Bulygin conceive of a normative system as a set of sentences deductively correlating pairs
of sentences. According to them, a set α of sentences deductively correlates a pair 〈p,q〉
of sentences if q is a deductive consequence of {p} ∪α, or, in symbols, if q ∈ Cn({p} ∪α).
For α to be a normative system the additional requirement is made that there be at least
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one pair 〈p,q〉 where q ∈ Cn({p} ∪α) such that p is a case and q is a solution. (A solution
is a normative sentence expressed in terms of deontic operators for command, prohibition
or permission.) As observed by Alchourrón and Bulygin, the statement q ∈ Cn({p} ∪ α) is
equivalent to (p ⊃ q) ∈ Cn(α) where ⊃ is the symbol for truth-functional implication.
If propositional logic is used as a basis it is usually presupposed that p,q are closed
sentences with no free variables, i.e., for example, p is the sentence “Smith has promised
to pay Jones $100” and q is “Smith has an obligation to pay $100 to Jones”. In these
sentences, individuals are referred to by individual constants (names). While it is true that
a normative system may correlate sentences of this kind, a set of sentences containing
individual names is not, however, an appropriate representation of a normative system.
A normative system expresses general rules where no individual names occur. If the task
is to represent a normative system this feature of generality has to be taken into account.
One way to do justice to the generality of norms is to represent a normative system in
the language of predicate logic, i.e., by sentences like “For any x and y: if x has promised
to pay $y to z then x has an obligation to pay $y to z.” From such a general norm, instanti-
ations concerning Smith, Jones and the amount of $100 can be derived by predicate logic,
i.e., if α is a set of general norms and p,q are closed sentences about Smith, Jones etc.,
sentences like the above q ∈ Cn({p} ∪ α) and (p ⊃ q) ∈ Cn(α) will come out true. Thus
it will still be true that the normative system “normatively correlates” propositions about
individuals.
When Alchourrón and Bulygin speak of normative “solutions” being correlated to “cas-
es”, however, they have in mind correlation of “generic” cases to “generic” solutions. They
emphasize the distinction between individual and generic cases, and an analogous distinc-
tion holds for solutions. An individual case is a situation or a state of affairs. As such,
appropriately, it should be described by a closed sentence. On the other hand, a generic
case is a property or a set of individual cases, defined by a property.1,2 Therefore, a “case”
in the generic sense relevant to Alchourrón and Bulygin is an object described by an open
sentence.3 Consequently, when the expression q ∈ Cn({p} ∪ α) is said to express that α
correlates q to p, q and p must be thought of as “open” sentences like “x has promised to
pay $y to z”, “x has an obligation to pay $y to z”, not prefixed by any universal quantifier.4
1 By an individual case is meant an element of the UD (the universe of discourse), where the UD is ”a set of
situations or states of affairs” [1, p. 28, and p. 10]. A generic case is described alternatively as a subset of the UD
defined by a property, or as this defining property itself. The set of generic cases is called the UC (the universe of
cases) [1, p. 29].
2 Each property P is a bipartition of the set of individual cases, i.e., each either possesses or lacks property
P . The set of properties in view for a legal problem is called the universe of properties, the UP [1, p. 10, pp. 26f,
and p. 12].
3 Since (generic) cases are described alternatively as sets, it might seem that another way to conceive of nor-
mative correlation would be in terms of set-theoretical inclusion between relations, where relations are understood
to be sets of ordered n-tuples. This path (not suggested or commented upon in [1]) meets difficulties in the case
that two relations R1 and R2 have different arity (for example, R1 is unary and R2 is binary). If R1 and R2 have
different arity, R1 ∩R2 = ∅.
4 Cf. [1, p. 49]: “According to the Deduction theorem the conditional sentence ‘if x is 21, then he may admin-
ister his property’ is a consequence of the set A if and only if the sentence ‘x may administer his property’. . . is
a consequence of the set composed of the set A . . . and the sentence ‘x is 21’. . . ”.
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Some features of the theory of Alchourrón and Bulygin can be summarized as follows.
They conceive of a normative system α as represented by a set of universally quantified
sentences where deontic operators occur in the consequents. They speak of cases and so-
lutions as objects that are described by “open” sentences. The normative system correlates
cases to solutions. The correlation is accomplished by there being a relation of consequence
Cn such that α correlates solution q to case p to if q ∈ Cn({p} ∪ α).
A difficulty for the theory of Alchourrón and Bulygin is that, due to the features men-
tioned, the deductive machinery, expressed in terms of p ⊃ q ∈ Cn(α), is not based either
on propositional logic or on predicate logic or on the logic of relations.5 The question there-
fore arises whether it is possible to introduce a proper deductive machinery while retaining
the idea that a normative system correlates objects called (generic) cases and solutions.
(Instead of “cases” and “solutions” we might say “grounds” and “consequences”.)
In a series of papers [10–13,17,18], the present authors have developed a theory of
condition implication structures (cis’s) for dealing with the representation of normative
systems. This theory was aimed specifically at analyzing the role of intermediate concepts
(like contract, ownership) for coupling normative consequences to descriptive grounds
within a normative system.
Our representation of normative systems in the papers referred to is similar to that of
Alchourrón and Bulygin insofar as we study normative systems essentially as deductive
mechanisms yielding outputs for inputs. (See, for example, [12, p. 91].) A difference, how-
ever, is that, in our approach, while input and output are particular, norms are explicitly
general in character.
A logically satisfactory theory of implication between conditions requires a general
logical theory as its basis. This theory is presented in the form of a theory of Boolean
quasi-orderings, or Bqo’s for short. The Bqo theory is a general algebraic theory having
models of many kinds. As will appear, the theory of cis’s is one of its models.
1.2. Normative positions
The theory of normative positions, in its modern logical form, essentially was shaped
by the Swedish logician Stig Kanger [6,7]. Kanger’s theory was inspired by the system
of “fundamental jural relations” proposed by the American jurist W.N. Hohfeld in 1913,
but took advantage of the development of formal logic. Of particular importance in this
respect was Georg Henrik von Wright’s reformulation of deontic logic. As realized by
Kanger, however, standard deontic logic, with a deontic operator applied to sentences,
is not adequate for expressing the Hohfeldian distinctions. The improvement proposed
by Kanger was to combine a standard deontic operator Shall with an action operator Do
(for “sees to it that”) and to exploit the possibilities of external and internal negation of
5 The character of the operator for implication is problematic. In connection with the consequence operation
Cn the symbol ⊃ is used. This symbol is said to be the symbol for material implication in truth-functional logic
(see [1, p. 12, note 3]). Can an open sentence, like “x has promised to pay $y to z”, be true or false? At p. 57,
the implication “q implies Pp” (where P stands for “Permitted”) is expressed by Pp/q, where a binary “dash”
operator / is used instead of ⊃. Whether this is a significant change is not clear, since the dash operator / is not
specifically characterized or commented upon.
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sentences where these operators are combined. Kanger’s theory, expressed as a theory of
types of rights, was further developed by Lars Lindahl in his three systems of types of
normative positions [9]. Some further refinement of the systems have recently been made
by Andrew J.I. Jones and Marek Sergot [4,5,19,20]. A special feature of the work of Jones
and Sergot is that applications in computer science are in view.
To the Boolean connectives of negation, conjunction etc., Kanger added the modal ex-
pressions “Shall“ and “Do”. If F is a state of affairs and x is an agent,6 Shall F is to be
read “It shall be the case that F ” and Do(x,F ) should be read “x sees to it that F ”. The
expression MayF is an abbreviation for ¬Shall¬F .
Kanger exploited the possibilities of combining the deontic operator Shall with the ac-
tion operator Do. One example is Shall Do(x,F ) which means that it shall be that x sees
to it that F ; another is ¬Shall Do(y,¬F) which means that it is not the case that it shall
be that y sees to it that not F .
The logical postulates for Shall and Do assumed by Kanger are as follows (where −→
is a relation of logical consequence7):
1. If F −→ G, then Shall F −→ Shall G.
2. (Shall F & Shall G) −→ Shall(F&G).
3. Shall F −→ ¬Shall ¬F .8
4. If F −→ G and G −→ F , then Do(x,F ) −→ Do(x,G).
5. Do(x,F ) −→ F .
The construction of types of normative position will be described in a later section
(Section 4.1.1). One example is Shall Do(x,F ), expressing that it shall be that x sees to it
that F , another is Shall(¬Do(x,F ) & ¬Do(x,¬F)), expressing that it shall be that x is
passive with regard to F .9
The systems of normative positions can serve as a tools for describing the normative
positions of different agents x, y, z, . . . with regard to states of affairs F,G,H, . . . .10 A set
6 A state of affairs in Kanger’s sense might be, for example, that Mr. Smith gets back the money lent by him
to Mr. Black, or that Mr. Smith walks outside Mr. Black’s shop.
7 The principles assumed by Kanger for the relation of logical consequence (−→) are as follows:
(i) If F and F −→ G, then G;
(ii) If F −→ G, then ¬G −→ ¬F ;
(iii) If F −→ G and G −→ H , then F −→ H .
See [8, p. 88, note 3].
8 Expressed in terms of May, the postulates become:
1. If F → G, then May F → May G.
2. May(F vG) → MayF v MayG.
3. ¬MayF → May¬F.
9 In [4] and [19,20], an alternative scheme is used, which, for one-agent types yields the same results as the
one used here and in [9, Chapter 3]), provided that the deontic postulates 1–3 above are assumed, but which does
not depend on these specific postulates.
10 For example, if x is the Swedish Government and F is the state of affairs that a paper on normative positions
by Lindahl is published in Sweden, the position, according to Swedish law, of x with regard to F can be described
by Shall(¬Do(x,F ) & ¬Do(x,¬F)), expressing that the Government is not allowed either to bring about or
prevent the publication.
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of such descriptions, however, is not a representation of a normative system. This is due
to the fact that a normative system is not a description of the actual normative positions
of individuals. Rather the essential feature of a normative system consists in so-called
normative correlations, i.e., as jurists might say, in correlating normative consequences to
operative facts.
In the present paper, the Bqo approach to normative systems will be combined with the
Kanger–Lindahl theory of normative positions.
2. Boolean quasi-orderings
2.1. Basic notions
Though the theory of Boolean quasi-orderings (Bqo’s) will be used here for special
purposes, the notion of a Boolean quasi-ordering is of a general character. A Bqo is any
relational structure based on a Boolean algebra and satisfying certain requirements.11
As is well-known, the postulates for a Boolean algebra 〈B,∧,∨, ′〉, with  as the unit
element and ⊥ as the zero element, are as follows:
a ∧ b = b ∧ a a ∨ b = b ∨ a
a ∧ (b ∧ c) = (a ∧ b) ∧ c a ∨ (b ∨ c) = (a ∨ b)∨ c
a ∧ (a ∨ b) = a a ∨ (a ∧ b) = a
a ∧ (b ∨ c) = (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c) a ∨ (b ∧ c) = (a ∨ b)∧ (a ∨ c)
a ∧  = a a ∨ ⊥ = a
a ∧ a′ = ⊥ a ∨ a′ = 
Since ∨ is definable by a ∨ b = (a′ ∧ b′)′, in what follows, instead of 〈B,∧,∨, ′〉 we
use the notation 〈B,∧, ′〉 for a Boolean algebra with B as its domain.
Definition 1. A Boolean quasi-ordering (Bqo) is defined as follows. Assume that 〈B,∧, ′〉
is Boolean algebra, and that R is a binary, reflexive and transitive, relation on B . Then,
the relational structure 〈B,∧, ′,R〉 is a Boolean quasi-ordering if R satisfies the
following conditions for all a, b and c in B:
(1) aRb and aRc implies aR(b ∧ c).
(2) aRb implies b′Ra′.
(3) (a ∧ b)Ra.
(4) not R⊥.
A Boolean quasi-ordering 〈B,∧, ′,R〉 will be denoted by B (calligraphic). Furthermore,
Boolean quasi-orderings 〈B,∧, ′,R〉 and 〈Bi,∧, ′,Ri〉 will be denoted by B and Bi . The
11 The theory of Boolean quasi-orderings was introduced in [17] and further developed in [13]. In two earlier
papers [10,11] a theory with the same aim but based on lattice theory was presented. In [12] a study was made of
systems weaker than Boolean quasi-orderings but generating such orderings.
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indifference part of R is denoted Q and is defined by: aQb if and only if aRb and bRa.
Similarly, the strict part of R is denoted S and is defined by: aSb if and only if aRb and
not bRa.
Let  be the partial ordering determined by the Boolean algebra 〈B,∧, ′〉.12 From re-
quirement (3) for Bqo’s it follows that a  b implies aRb.13 As a special case, we note that
a ⊥ implies aR⊥, and  a implies Ra.
Next we introduce some general notions relating to Bqo’s. If 〈B,∧, ′,R〉 is a Bqo then
we say that the Boolean algebra 〈B,∧, ′〉 is the reduct of 〈B,∧, ′,R〉. In what follows, the
reduct 〈B,∧, ′〉 of a Bqo B will be denoted Bred.
Suppose that B = 〈B,∧, ′,R〉 is a Bqo and Q is the indifference part of R. The quo-
tient algebra of B with respect to Q is a structure 〈B/Q,∩,−,Q〉 such that 〈B/Q,∩,−〉
is a Boolean algebra and Q is the partial ordering determined by this algebra.14 The
natural mapping of 〈B,∧, ′〉 onto 〈B/Q,∩,−〉 is a homomorphism (see [18]). We call
〈B/Q,∩,−〉 the quotient reduction of B. Thus there are two Boolean algebras which
should be kept apart, namely Bred, i.e., the reduct of B, and the quotient reduction of B. If
the quotient reduction of B is isomorphic to Bred, R =, and we say that B is conserva-
tively reducible.
Although, by a transition to equivalence classes, from a Boolean quasi-ordering we get
a new Boolean algebra, in what follows we will not make this transition. The point is that,
in the models we have in mind, where the domain of a Bqo is a set of conditions, even
though, for two conditions a and b, it holds that aQb (and therefore a and b belong to
the same Q-equivalence class), we may want to distinguish a and b because they may
have different meaning. Therefore, there is a point in remaining within the framework of
Boolean quasi-orderings as defined above.15
2.1.1. Atoms of a Bqo
The notion of an atom in a Boolean algebra is standard, but we also introduce the notion
of a dual atom.
Definition 2. Let 〈B,∧, ′〉 be a Boolean algebra. Then
(1) a is a an atom in 〈B,∧, ′〉 if (i) not a = ⊥ and (ii) b  a implies that either b = a
or b = ⊥, i.e., a is an atom in 〈B,∧, ′〉 if there is no b ∈ B such that ⊥ < b and b < a.
(2) a is a dual atom in 〈B,∧, ′〉 if (i) not a =  and (ii) a  b implies that either
b = a or b = , i.e., a is a dual atom in 〈B,∧, ′〉 if there is no b ∈ B such that a < b and
b < .
12 As usual,  is defined by a  b if and only if a ∧ b = a.
13 By definition, a  b implies a ∧ b = a and, since, by (3), it holds that a ∧ bRb, it follows that aRb.
14 Note that the slash sign / will be used in two ways. Firstly, it is used for denoting equivalence classes like in
B/Q. Then B is presupposed to be a set and Q an equivalence relation. Secondly it used to denote the restriction
of a relation to a particular subset of its field, like in R/B1 (where R is a relation over B and B1 is a subset of
B). When / is used in this way, R is presupposed to be a relation and B1 a set.
15 The theory of Boolean quasi-orderings is of a very general character, and it is easy to see that we can con-
struct a model of this theory out of a first order theory Σ . Consider the structure 〈B,∧, ′,R〉 where 〈B,∧, ′〉 is the
Lindenbaum algebra of the predicate calculus. Let R be the quasi-ordering on B determined by the Lindenbaum
algebra of Σ. Then 〈B,∧, ′,R〉 is a Bqo. Cf. [2, p. 61], and [3, p. 73].
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From Lemma 4 below it follows that a is an atom in the Boolean algebra 〈B,∧, ′〉 iff a′
is a dual atom in 〈B,∧, ′〉.
As usual, a Boolean algebra 〈B,∧, ′〉 is said to be atomic if for each b ∈ B such that not
b⊥ there is an atom a of 〈B,∧, ′〉 such that a  b.
The notions of atom and dual atom are extended to Bqo’s.
Definition 3. Let a be an element of a Bqo B. Then,
(1) a is an atom in B if (i) not aQ⊥ and (ii) bRa implies that either bQ⊥ or bQa, i.e.
a is an atom if there is no c ∈ B such that ⊥Sc and cSa,
(2) a is a dual atom in B if (i) not aQ and (ii) aRb implies that either bQ or
bQa, i.e. a is a dual atom if there is no b ∈ B such that aSb and bS.16
Also we say that a Bqo B is atomic if for each b ∈ B such that not bR⊥ there is an atom
a of B such that aRb.
In what follows, at(B), dual at(B), at(Bred), dual at(Bred) denote the set of atoms and
dual atoms, respectively, of B, Bred. Furthermore, for a ∈ B , at(a) denotes the set of all
b ∈ at(Bred) such that b  a. Note that, if Bred is atomic, then, for a ∈ B it holds that
a = sup at(a) (where sup is supremum with respect to , as defined in the usual way
for partial orderings).
Lemma 4. Let a be an element of a Bqo B. Then, a is an atom in a Bqo B if and only if a′
is a dual atom in B.
Proof. Suppose that a is an atom in B. Hence, not aQ⊥ and from this follows not a′Q.
Now suppose that a′Rb, which implies that b′Ra. Since a is an atom it follows that b′Q⊥
or b′Qa, which is equivalent to bQ or bQa′. Thus, a′ satisfies the requirements for being
a dual atom. The other part of the equivalence in the lemma is proved analogously. 
The concept of an atom in a Bqo is different from the concept of an atom in a Boolean
algebra. It is important to distinguish between the two kinds of atoms, since it can be the
case that a is an atom in Bred, while a is not an atom in B, and conversely.17 For the
interrelation between the two kinds of atoms, however, the following holds.
Lemma 5. Let B be a Boolean quasi-ordering. Then,
(1) if a is an atom in Bred, then a is an atom in B or aQ⊥,
16 With regard to a Boolean algebra 〈B,∧, ′〉, the notion of dual atom can be explained as follows. If φ is
a statement on Boolean algebras, its dual statement dφ is obtained by systematically exchanging the symbols
∨,∧,⊥, in φ. If φ is the statement that a is an atom in 〈B,∧, ′〉 the dual statement in this sense is that a is a
dual atom in 〈B,∧, ′〉, meaning that (i) not  = a and (ii) a  b implies that either  = b or b = a. Likewise as
the notion of atom is extended to Bqo’s by substituting R for  and Q for =, the notion of dual atom is extended
to Bqo’s in the same way.
17 Suppose a ∧ b is an atom in B as well as in its reduct. Then, if a ∧ b Q a while a ∧ b < a, a is an atom in B
but not in the reduct of B. Suppose a is an atom in the reduct of B, while aQ⊥. Then a is an atom in the reduct
of B but a is not an atom in B.
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(2) if a is a dual atom in Bred then a is a dual atom in B or Ra.Proof. (1) Suppose that, for some b ∈ B , it holds that not aRb. It follows that not a  b,
hence, since a is an atom in Bred, a  b′, i.e., b  a′, and so, bRa′.18 Consequently, if bRa
and not aRb, then bRa ∧ a′, i.e., bR⊥. Thus there is no b ∈ B such that bRa and not aRb
and not bR⊥. Therefore, according to Definition 3, if not aR⊥, a is an atom in B.
(2) is proved analogously. 
Also note that if a is an atom in B and aQb, then b is an atom in B. Furthermore, if a
and b are atoms in B, then a ∧ bQ⊥ or aQb.
Lemma 6. Suppose that the Boolean quasi-ordering B is finite. Then if a is an atom in B,
there is an atom b in Bred such that aQb.
Proof. Suppose that a is an atom in B but that a is not an atom in Bred. Since Bred is finite
and hence atomic, a = sup at(a). By Lemma 5, if b ∈ at(a) then b is an atom in B or
bQ⊥, and further, b  a which implies bRa. Suppose not bQ⊥. Then, if bSa, a is not
an atom in B, which contradicts the assumption, hence bQa. Thus we have proved that if
b ∈ at(a) then bQ⊥ or bQa. Suppose now that for all b ∈ at(a), bQ⊥. Since B is finite,
sup at(a)Q⊥, i.e., aQ⊥, which implies a contradiction. Thus there is b ∈ at(a) such that
not bQ⊥ and bQa. 
2.1.2. Least upper bound and greatest lower bound in a Bqo
The notions of least upper bound and greatest lower bound are usually defined for partial
orderings not for quasi-orderings. Since the relation R is a quasi-ordering, we introduce the
following definitions of these notions for quasi-orderings.
Definition 7. Let R be a quasi-ordering of a set A with X ⊆ A, and let a ∈ A. Then, with
respect to R,
• a is an upper bound for X, denoted a ∈ ubRX, if xRa for all x ∈ X,
• a is a lower bound for X, denoted a ∈ lbRX, if aRx for all x ∈ X,
• a is a least upper bound for X, denoted a ∈ lubRX, if a is an upper bound for X and
aRb for all upper bounds b for X,
• a is a greatest lower bound for X, denoted a ∈ glbRX, if a is a lower bound for X and
bRa for all lower bounds b for X.
We note that (in contrast to what holds for partial orderings) a least upper bound or a
greatest lower bound relative to a quasi-ordering 〈A,R〉 need not be unique. Hence lubRX
and glbRX denote subsets of X, not elements. However, if x, y ∈ lubRX or x, y ∈ glbRX
18 The proof that if a is an atom in a Boolean algebra 〈B,∧, ′〉 and b ∈ B, then not (a  b) implies a  b′, is
standard. We have a∧b  a, hence, by the definition of atom, if a is an atom in 〈B,∧, ′〉, a∧b = a or a∧b = ⊥,
i.e., a  b or a  b′. Both cannot hold, since then we get a = ⊥, which contradicts the assumption that a is an
atom. We note that the proof does not presuppose that 〈B,∧, ′〉 is finite or atomic.
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then xQy . Furthermore, if x ∈ lubRX and xQy , then y ∈ lubRX, and analogously for
glbRX.
3. Cis models of the Bqo theory
By a condition implication structure (cis) is meant a Bqo B = 〈B,∧, ′,R〉 such that B
is a domain of conditions, and R is such that aRb represents that a implies b. This reading
is justified since, if a and b are ν-ary conditions, aRb is the representation of
∀x1, . . . , xν :a(x1, . . . , xν) → b(x1, . . . , xν).
If S is a normative system represented by B, a normative correlation in S is represented by
a1Ra2, where a1, a2 ∈ B , and a1 is descriptive while a2 is normative.19
In simple cases, conditions can be denoted by expressions, using the sign of the infini-
tive, such as “to be 21 years old”, “to be a citizen of the US”, “to be a child of”, “to be
entitled to inherit”, or by corresponding expressions in the ing-form, like “being 21 years
old” etc. Often, however, conditions should appropriately be expressed by open sentences,
like “x’s promises to pay $y to z”, “x is a citizen of state y”, “x is entitled to inherit y”.
When a condition is expressed by an open sentence, free variables like x, y, z, . . . .
occurring in the sentence merely are place-holders for expressing the condition in a conve-
nient way and keeping track of the order of the places. In simple cases like, “committing
murder implies being liable to imprisonment”, place-holders are not needed.
A condition like “x promises to pay $y to z” is said to be fulfilled or non-fulfilled
by a particular triple, such as 〈Smith, 100, Jones〉. The fulfillment of a condition by a
particular n-tuple of individuals is a state of affairs, and is expressed by a sentence naming
the individuals of the n-tuple.
A framework with implication between conditions seems to accord with the presup-
posed ontology of legal language where terms such as “citizenship”, “inheritance”, “own-
ership”, denote conditions that are treated as objects between which there is an implicative
relation of “ground-consequence”, often expressed in terms of “gives rise to” or “causes”,
or “implies”. Thus inheritance is said to give rise to ownership and ownership is said to
imply a bundle of liberties, claims, and immunities.
Conditions have many affinities with relations, if, as is usual, relations are regarded ex-
tensionally as sets of ordered n-tuples. Obviously, the operations of negation, conjunction
and disjunction for conditions have as counterparts the operations of complement, inter-
section and union for relations. However, if R1 and R2 are relations of different arity, their
intersection R1 ∩R2 is empty and their union is not a relation. For example the intersection
between a set of pairs and a set of triples is empty, and the union of a set of pairs and a set
of triples is not a relation. The case is different with conditions, where sameness of arity is
not presupposed for intersection and union.
19 The present section on condition implication structures recapitulates ideas presented in earlier papers. See,
in particular, [13,17].
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A full algebraic treatment of conditions, having the same expressive power as predicate
logic, presupposes a framework of cylindric algebra.20 This extensive framework will not
be provided in what follows. Rather, in what follows, only a fragment of a theory of condi-
tions will be developed. The treatment is made algebraic within the framework of the Bqo
theory, where relations between conditions can be introduced.
3.1. The arity of conditions
Conditions can be of different arity (unary, binary etc.). Examples of (binary) con-
ditions are: to be the father of, to be the guardian of, to administer the property of,
having the obligation to administer the property of, having the right to compensation for,
etc. Where a condition is represented by an expression a(x1, . . . , xν) we presuppose that
x1, . . . , xν are free variables which function as place-holders, and that a(x1, . . . , xν) is a
sentence-form. If a and b are ν-ary conditions, we form compound ν-ary conditions by ′
(negation), ∧ (conjunction), and ∨ (disjunction).  is the ν-ary empty condition such that
for no x1, . . . , xν,⊥(x1, . . . , xν), and ⊥ is the ν-ary universal condition such that for all
x1, . . . , xν , (x1, . . . , xν).
The arity of a′ is always the same as the arity of a. For example, since being a
woman is a unary condition, not being a woman is unary as well. For conjunction the
following rule is adopted. If a is µ-ary and b is ν-ary and φ = max{µ,ν}, then, for all
x1, . . . , xφ, (a ∧ b)(x1, . . . , xφ) iff a(x1, . . . , xµ) and b(x1, . . . , xν). Thus the arity of a ∧ b
equals the greatest of the arities of a and b. For example, if a is the condition to be a
woman and b is the condition to be a parent of, then a ∧ b is the condition of being a
mother of. As regards the identity relation = for conditions, if a is µ-ary and b is ν-ary
and φ = max{µ,ν}, a = b implies that, for all x1, . . . , xφ , a(x1, . . . , xµ) iff b(x1, . . . , xν).
3.2. The implicative relation R
Since any cis is a model of the Bqo theory, R is reflexive, transitive and fulfills the
requirements (1)–(4) above for Bqo’s, i.e.,
(1) aRb and aRc implies aR(b ∧ c).
(2) aRb implies b′Ra′.
(3) (a ∧ b)Ra.
(4) not R⊥.
While the conditions in the domain of a cis are general (like x’s promising to pay $y to
z, where x, y, z are place-holders, not individual constants), a cis can be applied to individ-
uals. This is accomplished by deductions of the following kind, where i, j are individual
constants, for instance names of individuals. Let B = 〈B,∧, ′,R〉 be a cis, let a, b be ν-ary
20 In choosing our approach of considering Boolean algebras of conditions, we have been inspired by some
lectures of Stig Kanger’s, given in the Fall of 1977. In these lectures, Kanger started developing an algebraic
theory of conditions, based on Boolean and cylindric algebras.
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conditions that are elements of B , and let j1, . . . , jν be names of individuals. From an in-
stantiation of a, using the relation R of the cis B, we can derive an instantiation of b by the
scheme of inference:
a(j1, . . . , jν)
aRb
...
b(j1, . . . , jν).21
If aRb holds in a cis B = 〈B,∧, ′,R〉, we say that an instantiated condition a(j1, . . . , jν)
implies another instantiated condition b(j1, . . . , jν) by way of B.
In the approach to normative systems adopted in this paper, a normative system is rep-
resented by a cis and the cis is seen as a deductive mechanism for inferring normative
consequences from descriptive grounds. (Cf. Section 1.1.) In the cis representation, the
norms belonging to such a system are represented by a relation R on the domain of con-
ditions. Thus general rules in a normative system S are represented by an implicative
relation R between conditions, i.e., the set of rules is a set of ordered pairs of conditions.
For example, if a is the condition of x’s promising to pay $y to z, and b is the condition
of x’s having an obligation to pay $y to z, a rule in S correlating b to a is represented
by aRb.
If
(i) B = 〈B,∧, ′,R〉 is a cis,
(ii) aRb holds in B, and
(iii) B represents a normative system S ,
then we say that it follows from S that a implies b, or that, according to S , a implies
b, or that, according to S , a is a ground for b (and b is a consequence of a).22 Also, we
will say that the instantiation b(j1, . . . , jν) is deducible from the instantiation a(j1, . . . , jν)
according to S if aRb holds in a cis B = 〈B,∧, ′,R〉 representing S . Thus, a normative
system can be seen as a system of general norms, serving as a deductive mechanism for
inferring instantiated conditions from instantiated conditions.23
21 Since, in a cis 〈B,∧, ′,R〉, aRb is the representation of
∀x1, . . . , xν :a(x1, . . . , xν ) → b(x1, . . . , xν),
the scheme of inference is obviously valid.
22 If S is a normative system, the statement “according to S , a implies b” is often said to express a normative
proposition (cf. [1, p. 121]). We note that this normative proposition does not follow from aRb alone but from
the conjunction of (i)–(iii).
23 The approach of [15,16] is similar insofar as a normative system is seen by them as a deductive mechanism
for inferring an output of Boolean propositions from an input of Boolean propositions. Their framework for
representing normative systems, however, is different from ours in several respects.
74 L. Lindahl, J. Odelstad / Journal of Applied Logic 2 (2004) 63–91
4. Deontic cis models4.1. The cis version of normative positions
4.1.1. The Kanger–Lindahl theory
In earlier papers based on the Bqo approach, the present authors did not deal with the
fine-grained structure of a normative cis. A natural approach is to formulate this structure
in terms of deontic logic and action logic. As stated in the introduction, therefore, one aim
of present paper is to combine the Bqo approach to normative systems with an explicitly
algebraic version of the Kanger–Lindahl theory of normative positions. (See [9, Chapters
3–5]). The Bqo and cis approach of the present paper, aiming at the analysis of normative
correlations, is based on Boolean algebras of conditions. Therefore, the theory formulated
by Kanger and Lindahl in terms of modal operators Shall and Do is reformulated in a cis
model of the Bqo theory.
Since the present paper is a first step towards integrating normative positions within the
cis representations of normative systems, the types of normative positions dealt with are
chosen so as to be of a relatively simple kind.
The system of one-agent types of normative position, in the sense of [9, Chapter 3] are
based on the logic of Do and Shall as stated above in Section 1.2. The types are constructed
in the following way. If F is a state of affairs, let ±F stand for either of F or ¬F . Then
first, a list of three one-agent types of action is obtained as follows.
Starting from the scheme ±Do(x,±F), a list is made of all maximal and consistent
conjunctions such that each conjunct satisfies this scheme. Consistency is consistency ac-
cording to the logic of Do, and maximality means that if we add any further conjunct
satisfying the scheme, then this new conjunct either is inconsistent with the original con-
junction or redundant.24 By this procedure a list of three conjunctions is obtained, which
are denoted A1(x,F ),A2(x,F ),A3(x,F ):
A1(x,F ): Do(x,F ),
A2(x,F ): Do(x,¬F),
A3(x,F ): ¬Do(x,F ) & ¬Do(x,¬F).
Given the underlying logic of Do, the one-agent formulas are mutually incompatible
and their disjunction is a logical truth. (We note that the formula Do(x,F ) & Do(x,¬F)
is inconsistent in the logic of Do, since it implies F & ¬F .)
The formula A3(x,F ), i.e., ¬Do(x,F ) & ¬Do(x,¬F), expresses x’s passivity with
regard to F . This formula therefore, in what follows, is expressed by Pass(x,F ).
The three one-agent formulas are said to express action, passivity and counter-action
with regard to F , as they state that x sees to it that F , that x is passive with regard to F ,
and that x sees to it that not F , respectively.
24 There are several equivalent descriptions of how types of normative positions are constructed. The device
of ±-schemes and ”maxi-conjunctions” for obtaining a short and convenient description was invented by David
Makinson. See [14].
L. Lindahl, J. Odelstad / Journal of Applied Logic 2 (2004) 63–91 75
Next starting from the scheme ±MayAi(x,F ) (1 i  3), a list is made of all maximal
and consistent conjunctions, such that each conjunct satisfies this scheme. (Consistency
means consistency according to the logic of Shall and May.) By this procedure a list of
seven conjunctions is obtained, which express one-agent normative positions with regard
to F , and are denoted T1(x,F ), . . . , T7(x,F ):25
T1(x,F ): MayDo(x,F ) & MayPass(x,F ) & MayDo(x,¬F).
T2(x,F ): MayDo(x,F ) & MayPass(x,F ) & ¬MayDo(x,¬F).
T3(x,F ): MayDo(x,F ) & ¬MayPass(x,F ) & MayDo(x,¬F).
T4(x,F ): ¬MayDo(x,F ) & MayPass(x,F ) & MayDo(x,¬F).
T5(x,F ): MayDo(x,F ) & ¬MayPass(x,F ) & ¬MayDo(x,¬F).
T6(x,F ): ¬MayDo(x,F ) & MayPass(x,F ) & ¬MayDo(x,¬F).
T7(x,F ): ¬MayDo(x,F ) & ¬MayPass(x,F ) & MayDo(x,¬F).26
Given the underlying logic of Do and May, the one-agent formulas are mutually incon-
sistent and their disjunction is a logical truth. (We note that, since A1(x,F ) ∨ A2(x,F ) ∨
A3(x,F ) is a logical truth, formula
¬MayDo(x,F ) & ¬MayPass(x,F ) & ¬MayDo(x,¬F)
is logically false, according to the logic of Shall and May.)
Ti is said to be the converse of Tj if it holds that Ti(x,F ) if and only if Tj (x,¬F), and
Ti is neutral if it is its own converse (cf. [9, p. 92]). In this sense T2 is the converse of T4
and T5 the converse of T7, while T1, T3, T6 are neutral.
4.1.2. Normative position cis
The simplest way to combine the Bqo approach to normative systems with the theory
of one-agent normative positions is to transform the one-agent formulas T1(x,F ), . . . ,
T7(x,F ) into seven conditions. By such a transformation the theory of one-agent normative
positions can be expressed in algebraic version within the Bqo framework.
Suppose q is a ν-ary condition. Then Tiq (with 1  i  7) is the ν + 1-ary condition
such that
Tiq(y1, . . . , yν, x) iff Ti
(
x, q(y1, . . . , yν)
)
,
where Ti(x, q(y1, . . . , yν)) is the i-th formula of one-agent normative positions. Thus Ti ,
when occurring in Tiq , is an operator on conditions, defined in terms of one-agent type
Ti . A set {T1q, . . . , T7q} of seven conditions is obtained, and Boolean compounds of these
seven conditions are formed by ∧, ′,∨. Note that for example, (T1q ∨ T2q)(y1, . . . , yν, x)
25 See [9, p. 92].
26 The numbering of the Ti conforms to the numbering of the corresponding one-agent types of normative
position in [9]. The numbering suits the representation of the types in a Hasse diagram, exhibiting how the types
are partially ordered by the relation “less free than”. See [9, pp. 105 ff].
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x, q(y1, . . . , yν)
)
(see the list of one-agent formulas above).
If q is a descriptive condition, Tiq (1  i  7) is called a basic np-condition (np for
normative position). By an np-condition, simpliciter, we mean a basic np-condition or a
Boolean compound of such conditions.
We now present a construction which incorporates normative positions within the for-
mal cis framework. We do this by constructing what will be called an np-cis with regard to
a cis of descriptive conditions.
Let M = 〈M,∧, ′,R〉 be a cis (where Q is the similarity relation corresponding to
R) with a domain of descriptive conditions q1, q2, . . . . Furthermore, let TM = {Tiq | q ∈
M − {⊥,}, 1 i  7} and let T ∗M be the closure of TM under ∧, ′. Then T = 〈T ∗M,∧, ′〉
is a Boolean algebra, called a Boolean np-algebra with regard to M. An np-cis is defined
so as having a Boolean np-algebra as its reduct.
Definition 8. If T = 〈T ∗M,∧, ′〉 is a Boolean np-algebra with regard to M, then a cis N =〈T ∗M,∧, ′,RN 〉 is an np-cis with regard to M if for any q, r ∈ M it holds that
(1) if i = j , then Tiq ∧ Tjq RN ⊥ (for i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,7}),
(2)  RN (T1q ∨ · · · ∨ T7q),
(3) T1qQNT1q ′, T3qQNT3q ′, T6qQNT6q ′, T2qQNT4q ′, T5qQNT7q ′, and
(4) if qQr , then TiqQNTir .
Requirements (1)–(4) in the definition express restrictions on the relation RN in an np-
cis N and correspond to three features of one agent types in the Kanger–Lindahl theory.
Thus requirement (1) expresses that T1q, . . . , T7q are mutually incompatible, (2) that they
are jointly exhaustive, and (3) that T1, T3, T6 are neutral, while T4 is the converse of T2 and
T7 the converse of T2. Requirement (4), finally, corresponds to the “extensionality” feature
for combinations of operators Shall and Do in the Kanger–Lindahl theory.
As mentioned, T is the reduct ofN . Consequently, if a is an atom in T and not aQN⊥,
then a is an atom in N . Furthermore, if N is finite and a is an atom in N , then there is an
atom b in T such that aQNb (see Lemmas 5 and 6). Finally, the Boolean relation T of
T is a subset of the relation RN of N .
To give a very simple application of Definition 8, consider the case of a pair M,T
where
M= 〈{q1, q2,⊥,, },∧, ′,R〉 is a cis and q1, q2 are descriptive conditions,
T = 〈T ∗M,∧, ′〉 is a Boolean np-algebra with regard toM.
Let us consider the problem which, up to QN -similarity, is the maximal number of
atoms in an np-cis N with regard to M. We will establish that, up to QN -similarity, there
are at most 7 atoms (i.e., the quotient algebra of N has at most seven atoms). This can be
seen as follows.
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The set TM with regard to M has the 14 elements T1q1, . . . , T7q1, T1q2, . . . , T7q2. In
the np-algebra T , let +Tiqj denote Tiqj and let −Tiqj denote (Tiqj )′. The atoms of T











The number of these atoms is 27·2 (i.e., 214 = 16 384). The fact that, up to QN -similarity,
only seven atoms remain in an np-cis N with regard to M, is due to the requirements of
Definition 8.
We first establish the result of imposing requirement (1) of Definition 8 on the 214 atoms
of T . Let us consider an atom a in T = 〈T ∗M,∧, ′〉 and let l denote the left conjunct and
r the right conjunct of a. Each of l and r consists of seven conjuncts. First consider l. In
order that a = l ∧ r be an atom in N , it is required that not l RN⊥. Consequently, if the
sign chosen for conjunct Tiq1 of l is plus, the sign chosen for any conjunct Tjq1 of l, where
i = j , must be minus, since, according to requirement (1) in Definition 8, Tiq1 ∧Tjq1 RN ⊥
if i = j . Hence, for a = l ∧ r , if a is an atom in N , there are only seven possible values
for l:
T1q1 ∧ (T2q1)′ ∧ · · · ∧ (T7q1)′,
T2q1 ∧ (T1q1)′ ∧ (T3q1)′ ∧ · · · ∧ (T7q1)′,
...
T7q1 ∧ (T1q1)′ ∧ · · · ∧ (T6q1)′.
If we consider r , analogously there are seven possible values for r with regard to q2.
Hence, due to requirement (1) of Definition 8, up to QN -similarity there can be at most
72 atoms in N . Since, according to requirement (1) Tiq1RN(Tjq1)′ if i = j , these 49 QN -
equivalence classes can be represented by the following members:
(I)
T1q1 ∧ T1q2, T1q1 ∧ T2q2, . . . T1q1 ∧ T7q2
T2q1 ∧ T1q2, T2q1 ∧ T2q2, . . . T2q1 ∧ T7q2
...
... . . .
...
T7q1 ∧ T1q2, T7q1 ∧ T2q2, . . . T7q1 ∧ T7q2.
List (I) is further reduced by imposing requirement (3) of Definition 8 together with
requirement (1), taking into account that q2 = q ′1. For instance, by (3) it holds that
T4q2QNT2q1. It follows, for example, that T3q1 ∧ T4q2QNT3q1 ∧ T2q1, where only q1
appears in the conjunction to the right. Accordingly, T3q1 ∧ T4q2 is no atom in N , since
(according to requirement 1) T3q1 ∧ T2q1RN ⊥. It is easy to verify that, of the 49 classes
represented by table (I), only 7 are such that their members are QN -different from ⊥. This
shows that, in the case we have in view, of the 49 QN -equivalences classes of atoms in
T , there are only at most 7 that contain QN -different atoms in N . These classes can be
78 L. Lindahl, J. Odelstad / Journal of Applied Logic 2 (2004) 63–91








The list (II) can be simplified. Since q2 = q ′1, by requirement (3) of the definition each
of the two conjuncts in any line of (II) is QN -related to the other conjunct and hence QN -
related to the conjunction. Therefore, a further simplification is obtained by representing
the 7 classes by the respective members,
(III) T1q1, . . . , T7q1,
where only q1 occurs. Thus any atom in N is QN -related to an item in list (III). This
means that the 7 items in (III) represent the QN -equivalence classes of atoms that, at most,
there can be in N . Since, in our present application (whereM= 〈{q1, q2,⊥,},∧, ′〉 and
so q2 = q ′1), we are in fact concerned with the “one-condition case”, this is what can be
expected.
The example dealt with shows how Definition 8 works in the most simplistic case. The
justification of the definition is, of course that it opens up for generalizations to many-
conditions cases in a straightforward manner.
4.1.3. Liberty conditions
For seeing more clearly what various conditions in an np-cis amount to in deontic terms,
the notion of liberty conditions can be introduced (cf. [9, pp. 106ff]). This device is avail-
able since each np-condition equals a Boolean compound of liberty conditions.
Since the elements of an np-cis are np-conditions, we choose to define liberty conditions
in terms of disjunctions of basic np-conditions.
Definition 9. L1, L2, L3 are operators on conditions such that, if q is a condition:
(1) L1q is defined as: T1q ∨ T2q ∨ T3q ∨ T5q .
(2) L2q is defined as: T1q ∨ T2q ∨ T4q ∨ T6q .
(3) L3q is defined as: T1q ∨ T3q ∨ T4q ∨ T7q .
Accordingly, it holds that,
T1qQL1q ∧L2q ∧L3q,
T2qQL1q ∧L2q ∧ (L3q)′,
T3qQL1q ∧ (L2q)′ ∧L3q,
T4qQ(L1q)
′ ∧L2q ∧L3q,
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T5qQL1q ∧ (L2q)′ ∧ (L3q)′,
T6qQ(L1q)
′ ∧L2q ∧ (L3q)′,
T7qQ(L1q)
′ ∧ (L2q)′ ∧L3q.
Informally, the three liberty operators L1, L2 and L3 can be called action permissibility,
passivity permissibility and counter-action permissibility, respectively. In terms of May and
Do we can read non-negated liberty conditions as follows.
Action permissibility: L1
L1q(x1, . . . , xν, xν+1) iff May Do
(




L2q(x1, . . . , xν, xν+1) iff May Pass
(




L3q(x1, . . . , xν, xν+1) iff May Do
(
xν+1, q(x1, . . . , xν)′
)
.
These readings may prove to be helpful subsequently when dealing with examples of
normative correlation in a normative system, where an np-cis of normative consequences
is joined to a descriptive cis of grounds.
5. Normative systems
5.1. Fragments, joinings and connections
5.1.1. Basic definitions
Treating a normative system as a cis of conditions provides a convenient way of deal-
ing with normative correlations in a normative system. If a1 is a descriptive and a2 is a
normative condition, we will say that a1Ra2 describes a normative correlation for S . For
example, if a1 is the (descriptive) condition of being less than fifteen years old and a2 is the
(normative) condition of being liable to punishment, the statement that from S it follows
that a implies a′2, is represented by a1 R a′2. In the cis model of the Bqo theory we are
interested in, normative correlations will be studied primarily in terms of how a descriptive
cis B1 and an np-cis B2 can be combined.
For the purpose of this study, in the present section a number of concepts will be intro-
duced which will serve as tools for the analysis, together with lemmas or theorems relating
to these concepts. Most of these concepts, lemmas, and theorems are of a general character
in the sense that they belong to the level of the general Bqo theory rather than to the level
of cis models. In the course of the exposition, however, the use of the concepts at the more
specific cis level will be explained, with a view to normative systems.
Since, for the study of normative correlations, we need to distinguish between various
parts of a Bqo, an important notion is that of a fragment Bi of a Bqo B.
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Definition 10. If B = 〈B,∧, ′,R〉 is a Boolean quasi-ordering, and 〈Bi,∧, ′〉 is a subal-
gebra of 〈B,∧, ′〉, and Ri = R/Bi , then the structure Bi = 〈Bi,∧, ′,Ri〉 will be called a
fragment of B.27
We note that if B is a Bqo, and Bi is a fragment of B, then Bi is a Bqo.
The kinds of combinations of fragments that are in focus are those we call “joinings”,
“connections”, and “couplings”. It is appropriate to define these notions at the general Bqo
level.
Definition 11. Let B, B1, B2 be Bqo’s such that B1 and B2 are fragments of B. A joining
from B1 to B2 in B is a pair 〈b1, b2〉 in B such that b1 ∈ B1, b2 ∈ B2, b1Rb2, not b1R⊥
and not Rb2. A joining 〈b1, b2〉 from B1 to B2 is called strict if b1Sb2.
The set of joinings from B1,B2 (in B) will be denoted Joining(B1,B2). In the context
of a set Joining(B1,B2), we will often speak of B1 as the “lower” fragment and of B2 as
the “upper” fragment. In the same vein, if 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ Joining(B1,B2), we will sometimes
refer to b1 as the “bottom” of the joining and of b2 as the “top”.
Thus, if B is a cis representing a normative system, where B1 is descriptive and B2 is
normative, then Joining(B1,B2) is a set of normative correlations.
An important concept in the analysis of normative systems is that of “completeness”.
There are different kinds of completeness, among which is “joining-completeness”. At the
Bqo level we say that the pair 〈B1,B2〉 is upwards joining-complete if for all b1 ∈ B1,
where not Rb1, there is b2 ∈ B2, with not Rb2, such that b1Rb2. Conversely, 〈B1,B2〉
is downwards joining-complete if for all b2 ∈ B2, where not b2R⊥, there is b1 ∈ B1, with
not b1R⊥, such that b1Rb2.
If B is a cis representing a normative system, and B1 is descriptive while B2 is norma-
tive, upwards joining-completeness means that to any descriptive condition in B1 there is
correlated a normative condition, or “solution” in B2. Downwards joining-completeness
means that any normative condition in B2 is correlated to a descriptive condition in B1.
The notion of “connections” is of particular interest to our inquiry. If B1 has a domain
of descriptive conditions while the domain of B2 is normative, the set of connections from
B1 to B2 can be thought of as representing the specific legal content, for example the result
of legal enactment.28 Thus, an important component in creating a normative system is the
construction of several sets of ordered pairs of elements intended to be sets of connections,
and modifications of the system implies a change of one or several sets of connections.
27 The expression R/B1 denotes the restriction of the relation R to the set B1. We remind the reader of the
definition of a subalgebra of a Boolean algebra. If 〈B,∧, ′〉 is a Boolean algebra and A is a non-empty subset
of B such that A is closed under the operations ∧ and ′, then 〈A,∧A, ′A〉 is a subalgebra of 〈B,∧, ′〉 where ∧A
and ′
A
are restrictions of the operations ∧ and ′ to A. (That A is closed under the operations ∧ and ′ means
that if a,b ∈ A then a ∧A b ∈ A and a′A ∈ A.) If 〈A,∧A, ′A〉 is a subalgebra of 〈B,∧, ′〉 we often omit the
subscript A and denote it simply 〈A,∧, ′〉. Suppose that 〈A,∧, ′〉 is a subalgebra of 〈B,∧, ′〉 and let  be the
partial ordering determined by 〈B,∧, ′〉 and A the partial ordering determined by 〈A,∧, ′〉. Then A= /A
and infA {a,b} = inf {a,b} and supA {a,b} = sup {a,b}.
28 As will be discussed subsequently, this is especially plausible if each of B1 and B2 is conservatively re-
ductible.
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Definition 12. A connection from B1 to B2 in B is a pair 〈b1, b2〉 such that the follow-
ing four requirements are satisfied:
(i) 〈b1, b2〉 is a joining from B1 to B2 in B.
(ii) There is a1 ∈ B1\B2 and a2 ∈ B2\B1 such that a1Rb1 and b2Ra2.
(iii) If a1 ∈ B1 and b1Ra1Rb2 then a1Rb1.
(iv) If a2 ∈ B2 and b1Ra2Rb2 then b2Ra2.
Requirements (iii)–(iv) are called the proximity principles. Intuitively, if 〈b1, b2〉 is a
connection, then there is no element in B1 or B2 which is strictly between b1 and b2.
The set of connections from B1 to B2 in B will be denoted Conn(B1,B2).
We note that if 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2), then 〈b′2, b′1〉 ∈ Conn(B2,B1) (in B). We call〈b′2, b′1〉 the converse of the connection 〈b1, b2〉.
5.1.2. Development of connection theory
Informally, the first theorem to be stated below says that in a finite Bqo, each joining
such that b1 ∈ B1\B2 and b2 ∈ B2\B1 encompasses a connection.29 Thus in a finite cis
representing a normative system, if a descriptive and a normative condition are correlated
there is always a closest correlation serving as a vehicle between them.
Theorem 13. If B1 and B2 are fragments of a finite Bqo B, and 〈a1, a2〉 is a joining from
B1 to B2 such that a1 ∈ B1\B2, a2 ∈ B2\B1, then there is a connection 〈b1, b2〉 from B1 to
B2 such that a1Rb1 and b2Ra2.
Proof. We recall Definition 7. (1) Let b1 ∈ lubR1{c ∈ B1 | cRa2} and hence b1 ∈ lubR{c ∈
B1 | cRa2}. Then, since a1 ∈ {c ∈ B1 | cRa2}, a1Rb1. (We note that, since B is finite,
lubR1{c ∈ B1 | cRa2} = ∅, and since B1 is a fragment of B, lubR1{c ∈ B1 | cRa2} ⊆
lubR{c ∈ B1 | cRa2}. Next, let b2 ∈ glbR2{c ∈ B2 | b1Rc}, and hence, b2 ∈ glbR{c ∈
B2 | b1Rc}. Then, since a2 ∈ {c ∈ B2 | b1Rc}, b2Ra2. Again, we note that, since B is
finite, glbR2{c ∈ B2 | b1Rc} = ∅, and since B1, B2 are fragments of B, glbR2{c ∈ B2 |
b1Rc} ⊆ glbR{c ∈ B2 | b1Rc}. Finally, since b1 ∈ lbR{c ∈ B2 | b1Rc} and b2 ∈ glbR{c ∈
B2 | b1Rc}, b1Rb2. Thus a1Rb1, b1Rb2, b2Ra2. Therefore, since 〈a1, a2〉 is a joining,
〈b1, b2〉 is a joining as well, and requirement (i) for connections is fulfilled.
(2) Since a1 ∈ B1\B2, a2 ∈ B2\B1 it furthermore follows that requirement (ii) is ful-
filled.
(3) Suppose that c1 ∈ B1 and b1Rc1Rb2. From c1Rb2 and b2Ra2 it follows that c1Ra2.
Since c1Ra2 and b1 ∈ lubR{c ∈ B1|cRa2}, c1Rb1, which proves that 〈b1, b2〉 satisfies re-
quirement (iii) of a connection.
(4) Suppose that c2 ∈ B2 and b1Rc2Rb2. b1Rc2 together with b2 ∈ glbR{c ∈ B2 | b1Rc}
implies that b2Rc2, which shows that 〈b1, b2〉 satisfies requirement (iv) of a connec-
tion. 
29 A more general version of the theorem, not presupposing finiteness, is proved as Theorem 17 in [17].
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Let Conn(B1,B2) denote the set of connections from B1 to B2. The theorem be-
low (Theorem 15) states another fundamental property of Conn(B1,B2). First we state
a lemma.
Lemma 14. If 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2) and b1 ∈ B1, b2 ∈ B2, then:
(1) If a1Rb2, then a2Rb2.
(2) If b1Ra2, then b1Ra1.
Proof. (1) From 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2) it follows a1Ra2. The conjunction of a1Ra2 and
a1Rb2 implies a1R(a2 ∧ b2). Since a1R(a2 ∧ b2) and 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2), a2R(a2 ∧
b2). Consequently, a2Rb2.
(2) From 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2) it follows a1Ra2. The conjunction of a1Ra2 and
b1Ra2 implies (a1 ∨ b1)Ra2. Since (a1 ∨ b1)Ra2 and 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2), (a1 ∨
b1)Ra1. Thus b1Ra1. 
Theorem 15. If 〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2), then a1Rb1 if and only if a2Rb2.
Proof. Firstly, if 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2) and a1Rb1, by transitivity a1Rb2. If 〈a1, a2〉 ∈
Conn(B1,B2) and a1Rb2, then, by Lemma 14(1), a2Rb2. Secondly, if 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,
B2) and a2Rb2, by transitivity a1Rb2. If 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2) and a1Rb2, then, by
Lemma 14(2) (exchanging a for b and vice versa), a1Rb1. 
Thus, in a cis model of a normative system, where B1, a1, b1, are descriptive, B2, a2, b2
normative, and 〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉 are among the “closest” normative correlations, it holds
that a1 implies b1 if and only if a2 implies b2.
If B is finite and 〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2), we can form new connections by
using conjunction and disjunction. First we state a lemma and a corollary.
Lemma 16. If 〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2) and c1 ∈ B1, c2 ∈ B2, then,
(i) c1R(a2 ∧ b2) implies c1R(a1 ∧ b1).
(ii) (a1 ∨ b1)Rc2 implies (a2 ∨ b2)Rc2.
Proof. (i) If c1R(a2 ∧ b2), c1Ra2 and c1Rb2. Hence, if 〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2),
according to Lemma 14, (2), c1Ra1 and c1Rb1, consequently, c1R(a1 ∧ b1).
(ii) If (a1 ∨ b1)Rc2, a1Rc2 and b1Rc2. Hence, if 〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2), ac-
cording to Lemma 14, (1), a2Rc2 and b2Rc2, consequently, (a2 ∨ b2)Rc2. 
Corollary 17. Let 〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2). Then, if c1 ∈ B1 and c2 ∈ B2,
(i) a1 ∧ b1Rc1Ra2 ∧ b2 implies c1Qa1 ∧ b1,
(ii) a1 ∨ b1Rc2Ra2 ∨ b2 implies a2 ∨ b2Qc2.
The corollary follows immediately from the preceding lemma.
L. Lindahl, J. Odelstad / Journal of Applied Logic 2 (2004) 63–91 83
Theorem 18. Let B be finite with B1, B2 fragments of B and with 〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉 ∈
Conn(B1,B2). Then,
(1) If 〈a1 ∧ b1, a2 ∧ b2〉 is a joining from B1 to B2, then there is c2 ∈ B2 such that
〈a1 ∧ b1, c2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2), and c2R(a2 ∧ b2).
(2) If 〈a1 ∨ b1, a2 ∨ b2〉 is a joining, then there is c1 ∈ B1 such that 〈c1, a2 ∨ b2〉 ∈
Conn(B1,B2), and (a1 ∨ b1)Rc1.
Proof. (1) From Theorem 13 it follows that there is 〈c1, c2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2) such that
a1 ∧ b1Rc1Rc2Ra2 ∧ b2. Hence, from Corollary 17, (i), it follows that a1 ∧ b1Qc1. Con-
sequently there is c2 such that 〈a1 ∧ b1, c2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2) and c2Ra2 ∧ b2. The proof of
(2) is analogous. 
If 〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2) and 〈a1 ∧ b1, a2 ∧ b2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2), then, fig-
uratively speaking, the “R-strength” of a1 ∧ b1 with regard to a2 ∧ b2 equals the joint
“R-strength” of a1, a2. However, it can be the case that there is c2 ∈ B2 with 〈a1 ∧b1, c2〉 ∈
Conn(B1,B2), where c2S(a2 ∧ b2).30 Then, the “R-strength” of a1 ∧ b1 exceeds the joint
“R-strength” of a1, a2. In the latter case, a1 ∧ b1 might be called an “organic whole” with
regard to R and a2 ∧ b2.
Lemma 19. Let B be finite with B1, B2 fragments of B and with 〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉 ∈
Conn(B1,B2). Then,
(1) If 〈a2 ∧ b2〉 ∈ at(B2) and not a1 ∧ b1 R⊥, then 〈a1 ∧ b1, a2 ∧ b2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2).
(2) If 〈a1 ∨ b1〉 ∈ dual at(B1) and not Ra2 ∨ b2, then, 〈a1 ∨ b1, a2 ∨ b2〉 ∈
Conn(B1,B2).
Proof. (1) Since a1Ra2 and b1Rb2, a1 ∧ b1Ra2 ∧ b2. Since a2 ∧ b2Ra2 and not
Ra2, not Ra2 ∧ b2. Therefore, since, moreover, not a1 ∧ b1R⊥, 〈a1 ∧ b1, a2 ∧ b2〉 ∈
Joining(B1,B2). Hence, by Theorem 18, (1), there is c2 ∈ B2 such that 〈a1 ∧ b1, c2〉 ∈
Conn(B1,B2), and c2R2a2 ∧ b2. If a1 ∧ b1Rc2 and not a1 ∧ b1R⊥, not c2R⊥. Fi-
nally, if c2Ra2 ∧ b2 and not c2R⊥, since 〈a2 ∧ b2〉 ∈ at(B2), c2Qa2 ∧ b2. Consequently,
〈a1 ∧ b1, a2 ∧ b2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2). The proof of (2) is analogous. 
The following two, more special, lemmas will be needed later on.
Lemma 20. If aRb, cRd , Ra ∨ c and b ∧ dR⊥, then aQc′ and bQd ′.
Proof. First, since aRb and cRd , a ∧ cRb ∧ d , and since b ∧ dQ⊥, by transitivity, a ∧
cR⊥, and thus aRc′. Furthermore, since a ∨ cQ, c′Ra, and so, aQc′. Next, since aRb
and cRd , a ∨ cRb ∨ d . From this and R(a ∨ c), by transitivity, R(b ∨ d), i.e., d ′Rb.
From b ∧ dQ⊥ it follows bRd ′. Hence, bQd ′. 
Lemma 21. If aRb, cRd , and b ∧ dR⊥, then a ∧ cR⊥.
30 We recall that S is the strict relation corresponding to R.
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The proof is obvious.Atoms, dual atoms and connections. We note that if 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ Joining(B1,B2), and a2 ∈
at(B2) (see Definition 3), then there is b1 ∈ B1 such that 〈b1, a2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2).
Lemma 22. If a1 ∈ dual at(B1), and a2 ∈ at(B2), and a1Ra2, then 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2).
The proof is obvious.
Lemma 23. If a1 ∈ dual at(B1), and a2 ∈ at(B2), and a1Ra2, and 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2),
then (1) a1Qb1 and a2Qb2 or (2) a′1Qb1 and a′2Qb2.
Proof. Since a2 atom in B2, for every b2 ∈ B2, such that not b2Q⊥: (i) a2Rb2 or (ii) a2 ∧
b2Q⊥. First suppose a2Rb2. Then, since, by Lemma 22, 〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2),
by Theorem 15, a1Rb1. Therefore, since a1 is a dual atom in B1, b1Qa1 and, hence, by
Lemma 15, a2Qb2. Next suppose a2 ∧b2Q⊥. Then, by Lemma 21, a1 ∧b1Q⊥, and so, not
b1Ra1. Since a1 is a dual atom in B1, b1Ra1 or b′1Ra1.31 Consequently, since not b1Ra1,
b′1Ra1, i.e., a1 ∨ b1Q. Therefore, in this case, by Lemma 20, a′1Qb1 and a′2Qb2. 
Corollary 24. If a1 ∈ dual at(B1), and a2 ∈ at(B2), and a1Ra2, then,
(1) 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2) and,
(2) if 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2), then,
(i) a1Qb1 and a2Qb2 or,
(ii) a′1Qb1 and a′2Qb2.
The corollary follows immediately from Lemmas 22 and 23.
5.2. Couplings and pair couplings
Definition 25. Suppose that B is a Boolean quasi-ordering and B1 and B2 are fragments of
B. Then 〈b1, b2〉 is a coupling from B1 to B2 in B if the following three requirements
are satisfied:
(i) 〈b1, b2〉 is a joining from B1 to B2 in B.
(ii) There is a1 ∈ B1\B2 and a2 ∈ B2\B1 such that a1Rb1 and b2Ra2.
(iii) If a1 ∈ B1, a2 ∈ B2 and a1Ra2, then a1Rb1 and b2Ra2.
Let Coupl(B1,B2) denote the set of couplings fromB1 to B2. If 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ Coupl(B1,B2)
then 〈b′2, b′1〉 ∈ Coupl(B2,B1) and is called the converse of 〈b1, b2〉.
It is easy to see that every coupling from B1 to B2 in B is also a connection. Furthermore,
if there are more couplings than one from B1 to B2, these couplings are “similar”.
31 We note that, since a1Ra1 ∨b1, if a us a dual atom in B,  Ra1 ∨b1 or a1 ∨b1Qa1. I.e., b′1Ra1 or b1Ra1.
L. Lindahl, J. Odelstad / Journal of Applied Logic 2 (2004) 63–91 85
Theorem 26. If B1 and B2 are fragments of a Bqo B, and 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ Coupl(B1,B2) and
〈b1, b2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2), then a1Qb1 and a2Qb2.
Proof. Since b1Rb2 and 〈a1, a2〉 ∈ Coupl(B1,B2), b1Ra1 and a2Rb2. Since a1Ra2 we get
b1Ra1Rb2 and b1Ra2Rb2. Since 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2), from requirement (iii) and (iv)
of a connection follows a1Qb1 and a2Qb2. 
Definition 27. The set {〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉} is a pair coupling from B1 to B2 in B if
(1) 〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2),
(2) not a1Qb1,
(3) for all c1 ∈ B1 and c2 ∈ B2 it holds that if c1Rc2, then either
(i) c1Ra1 and a2Rc2, or,
(ii) c1Rb1 and b2Rc2.
If {〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉} is a pair coupling from B1 to B2, then we say that the converse
pair coupling from B2 to B1 is {〈a′2, a′1〉, 〈b′2, b′1〉}.
Definition 28. Let Sim(〈a1, a2〉) = {〈b1, b2〉 | a1Qb1 & a2Qb2}.
Lemma 29. {〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉} is a pair coupling iff Conn(B1,B2) = Sim(〈a1, a2〉) ∪
Sim(〈b1, b2〉).
The proof is obvious.
The lemma says that if {〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉} is a pair coupling and 〈c1, c2〉 is a connection,
then either c1Qa1 and c2Qa2, or c1Qb1 and c2Qb2. Thus, “up to similarity”, there are only
the two connections 〈a1, a2〉, 〈b1, b2〉.
Lemma 30. If Conn(B1,B2) = Sim(〈a1, a2〉) ∪ Sim(〈b1, b2〉), then (1) a1 ∧ b1Q⊥, or (2)
a1Rb1 and a2Rb2 or (3) b1Ra1 and b2Ra2.
Proof. Suppose that not a1 ∧ b1Q⊥. Hence, 〈a1 ∧ b1, a2 ∧ b2〉 ∈ Joining(B1,B2). Con-
sequently, by Theorem 18, there is a connection 〈a1 ∧ b1, c2〉 such that c2Ra2 ∧ b2. We
distinguish between two cases. Suppose (i) that 〈a1 ∧ b1, c2〉 ∈ Sim(〈a1, a2〉), i.e., suppose
that c2Qa2 and a1 ∧ b1Qa1. Then a1Rb1 and, by Lemma 15, a2Rb2. By analogous rea-
soning, if 〈a1 ∧ b1, c2〉 ∈ Sim(〈b1, b2〉), then b1Ra1 and b2Ra2. 
Corollary 31. If Conn(B1,B2) = Sim(〈a1, a2〉) ∪ Sim(〈b1, b2〉), and a1, b1 are R-
unrelated, then a1 ∧ b1Q⊥.32
The proof is obvious.
32 In the corollary, by “a1, b1 are R-unrelated” we mean that neither a1Rb1 nor b1Ra1.
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5.2.1. Couplings dual atom to atom
Theorem 32. If a1 is a dual atom in B1, and a2 an atom in B2, and a1Ra2, then, either
〈a1, a2〉 is a coupling, or, {〈a1, a2〉, 〈a′1, a′2〉} is a pair coupling.
Proof. The theorem follows from Corollary 24 and the Definitions 27 and 28 just
given. 
Corollary 33. If a1 is a dual atom in B1, and a2 an atom in B2, and a1Ra2, then,
(1) {〈a1, a2〉, (a′1, a′2〉} is a pair coupling from B1 to B2 iff a1Qa2.
(2) 〈a1, a2〉 is a coupling from B1 to B2 iff a1Sa2.
Proof. (1) If a1Qa2, then a′1Qa′2 and so, {a1, a2〉, (a′1, a′2〉} is a pair coupling. If{〈a1, a2〉, 〈a′1, a′2〉} is a pair coupling, then a1Ra2, a′1Ra′2 (i.e., a2Ra1), hence a1Qa2. (2)
If 〈a1, a2〉 is a coupling from B1 to B2, then a1Ra2, and, by (1), not a1Qa2. 
6. Normative position fragments joined to descriptive fragments
6.1. An example
As appears from the foregoing, in this paper we represent a normative system by a cis
with two fragments one of which is descriptive and the other is an np-cis (see above Sec-
tion 4.1.2). In the present section we illustrate this representation by a simple example
concerning the normative position of owners of real property in a legal system S . We con-
sider two fragmentsB1 = 〈B1,∧, ′,R1〉 and B2 = 〈B2,∧, ′,R2〉 of a cis B0 = 〈B0,∧, ′,R0〉
representing S . B1, called the “lower” fragment, is descriptive, while B2, called the “up-
per” fragment, is an np-cis. We recall that, since B1,B2 are fragments of B0, R1 is the
restriction of R0 to B1 and R2 the restriction of R0 to B2. (Obviously, from this it follows
that R1,R2 are subsets of R0.) The sets Joining(B1,B2) and Conn(B1,B2) refer to norma-
tive correlations in B0 by the relation R0, i.e., correlations between elements of B1, called
“grounds”, and elements of B2 called “consequences”.
6.1.1. The two cis fragments considered
The descriptive lower fragment B1. We assume that conditions a1 and a2, appearing in
the descriptive lower fragment B1 are as follows:
a1. Being the owner of an estate E.33
b1. Being the owner of an estate adjacent to estate E.
33 Letter E is to be regarded as a parameter, in the sense of a quantity which is constant in a particular case
considered, but which varies in different cases.
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We furthermore assume that B1 is as depicted in the following diagram (where α  β is
an abbreviation for (α ∧ β) ∨ (α′ ∧ β ′)).
B1 
a1 ∨ b1 a1 ∨ b′1 a′1 ∨ b1 a′1 ∨ b′1
a1 b1 a1  b1 a1  b′1 b′1 a′1
a1 ∧ b1 a1 ∧ b′1 a′1 ∧ b1 a′1 ∧ b′1
⊥
We note that B1 coincides with its reduct and that, therefore, in B1, R1 coincides with
1. As appears from the diagram, it is assumed that conditions a1 ∧ b1, a1 ∧ b′1, a′1 ∧
b1, a′1 ∧ b′1 are atoms in B1.
The upper normative fragment B2. Let conditions q1, . . . , q4 be as follows:
q1. Main building of estate E being painted white.
q2. Main building on estate adjacent to E being painted white.
q3. Cows of estate E entering land of adjacent estate.
q4. Erecting a fence, going around estate E and adjacent estate.
Let M = 〈M,∧, ′R〉 be a cis such that the descriptive conditions q1, q2, q3, q4 are
among the elements of its domain. Furthermore, as in Section 4.1.2, let TM = {Tiq | q ∈
M − {⊥,},1  i  7}, let T ∗M be the closure of TM under ∧, ′ and let T = 〈T ∗M,∧, ′〉
be a Boolean np-algebra with regard to M. Finally, let B2 = 〈T ∗M,∧, ′,R2〉 be an np-cis
with regard to M (see above Definition 8). We recall that, since T is the reduct of B2, the
Boolean relation T of T is a subset of the relation R2 of B2.
6.1.2. Joinings and connections
Joining assumptions. We assume that in the cis B0 representing legal system S the fol-
lowing holds:
(i) a1 ∧ b1R0T1q1 ∧ T1q2 ∧ T1q3 ∧ T1q4,
(ii) a1 ∧ b′1R0T1q1 ∧ T6q2 ∧ T7q3 ∧ T4q4,
(iii) a′1 ∧ b1R0T6q1 ∧ T1q2 ∧ T4q3 ∧ T4q4,
(iv) a′1 ∧ b′1R0T6q1 ∧ T6q2 ∧ T6q3 ∧ T6q4.
(Obviously, the conditions to the right of R0 in (i)–(iv) are among the elements of T ∗M , i.e.,
the domain of B2.)
Given the intended interpretation of conditions Tiqj in terms of Shall, May and Do,
the correlations (i)–(iv) are plausible for a legal system. This can be seen by inspection of
the different grounds and consequences correlated. For this purpose, the notion of liberty
conditions is useful (on liberty conditions, see above Section 4.1.3). To exemplify, a1 ∧ b1
means being the owner of both estate E and adjacent estate. This condition is a ground
for T1q1∧ T1q2∧ T1q3∧ T1q4, which is the np-condition denoting full freedom (opera-
tor T1) with regard to all of q1, . . . , q4 (painting the two buildings, letting the cows move
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around, erecting a surrounding fence). In contrast, a1 ∧ b′ means owning estate E but not1
adjacent estate. This condition is ground for np-condition T1q1 ∧ T6q2 ∧ T7q3 ∧ T4q4.This
np-condition denotes full freedom regarding the painting of building on estate E, no free-
dom to bring about or prevent painting of building on adjacent estate, obligation to see
to it that cows from estate E do not enter land of adjacent estate, and, finally, freedom to
prevent erection of the fence surrounding the estates and freedom to be passive about the
matter, but no freedom to bring about the fence’s being erected.
Connections from B1 to B2 in B0. To illustrate connection theory (Section 5.1.2) by our
example, let us assume that R0 is such that each of (i)–(iv) expresses a connection from B1
to B2 in B0. Thus, we assume that if
α1 = a1 ∧ b1
α2 = a1 ∧ b′1
α3 = a′1 ∧ b1
α4 = a′1 ∧ b′1
and
β1 = T1q1 ∧ T1q2 ∧ T1q3 ∧ T1q4,
β2 = T1q1 ∧ T6q2 ∧ T7q3 ∧ T4q4,
β3 = T6q1 ∧ T1q2 ∧ T4q3 ∧ T4q4,
β4 = T6q1 ∧ T6q2 ∧ T6q3 ∧ T6q4,
then 〈αi,βi〉 ∈ Conn(B1,B2), (1  i  4). It can be verified that, given this assump-
tion, it follows that each pair 〈αj ∨ αk,βj ∨ βk〉, 〈αj ∨ αk ∨ αl, βj ∨ βk ∨ βl〉 belongs
to Conn(B1,B2) (j, k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,4}). For a “two-disjuncts” pair 〈αj ∨ αk,βj ∨ βk〉 this is
established by showing that neither in B1 nor in B2 is there any element, distinct from ⊥,
strictly between αj ∨αk and βj ∨βk . This is seen as follows. Firstly, since 〈αj ,βj 〉, 〈αk,βk〉
are connections, by Lemma 16, (ii), there is no c2 ∈ B2 such that αj ∨ αkR0c2 and
c2S0βj ∨ βk . Secondly, suppose there is c1 ∈ B1 such that αj ∨ αkS0c1 and c1R0βj ∨ βk .
Since R0 restricted to B1 is 1, and αj ,αk are atoms in B1, from αj ∨αkS0c1R0βj ∨βk it
follows that, among the remaining two atoms in B1, there is an atom αm such that αmS0c1,
and hence such that αmR0βj ∨ βk . This, however, is impossible since if αm is an atom in
B1, then, according to the assumptions above, 〈αm,βm〉 is a connection for some βm such
that βm∧(βj ∨βk)Q0⊥. The proof that a “three-disjuncts” pair 〈αj ∨αk ∨αl, βj ∨βk ∨βl〉
belongs to Conn(B1,B2) is analogous.34
The foregoing demonstration has a special point. An np-cis involving several embedded
descriptive conditions q1, q2, q3, . . . will have a very large number of elements and may
seem difficult to handle as an upper normative fragment B2 of consequences correlated
to a lower descriptive fragment B1 of grounds. However, when considering a small lower
fragment B1 (representing the grounds that are of interest in a specific context), the set
of connections from B1 to B2 in B0 is small as well and can often be established without
regard to the overwhelming number of remaining elements of B2. In this way, handling the
np-cis construction is often easier than it might seem at first sight.
6.1.3. The expressive power of the np-cis construction
The theory of normative positions, as developed by Kanger, and by Lindahl in earlier
works, does not integrate normative positions into the framework of a normative system.
34 We note that the “four-disjuncts” pair 〈α1 ∨α2 ∨α2 ∨α4, β1 ∨β2 ∨β3 ∨β4〉 is no connection from B1 to B2
in B0. (We have R1α1 ∨α2 ∨α2 ∨α4 and α1 ∨α2 ∨α2 ∨α4R0β1 ∨β2 ∨β3 ∨β4, hence R0β1 ∨β2 ∨β3 ∨β4.)
A pair 〈,〉 is not a joining or connection in the sense defined.
L. Lindahl, J. Odelstad / Journal of Applied Logic 2 (2004) 63–91 89
Moreover, and that is the point in focus now, this theory only deals with normative positions
for one state of affairs F at a time. If normative positions for several states of affairs
F1, . . . ,Fm are considered, they are dealt with separately for each Fi .35 Obviously, the
np-cis construction has much greater expressive power.
Let us illustrate the difference by a simple case. As shown above, to α1 ∨ α2 (i.e., a1,
being owner of estate E) is connected the np-condition β1 ∨ β2, which in the Boolean
np-algebra T , equals,
(δ)T1q1 ∧
(
(T1q2 ∧ T1q3 ∧ T1q4) ∨ (T6q2 ∧ T7q3 ∧ T4q4)
)
.
In terms of the Boolean relation  of T , (δ) implies
(ε)T1q1 ∧ (T1q2 ∨ T6q2) ∧ (T1q3 ∨ T7q3) ∧ (T1q4 ∨ T4q4)
where the qi are distributed over the four conjuncts. However, (ε) does not imply (δ) in
terms of  and neither does (ε) imply (δ) in terms of R2 unless further special assump-
tions are made. In this sense, (δ) is richer in content than (ε). This difference in expressive
power is important, since normative positions often go together in a “bundle” for a partic-
ular ground-condition, such as one regarding ownership. Condition a1 encompasses two
possibilities, i.e., a1 ∧ b1 (being the owner of both estates) and a1 ∧ b′1 (being the owner
only of estate E). Condition (δ) exhibits the difference between, on one hand, the bundle
(relating to q2, q3, q4) that goes with a1 ∧ b1, namely the first of the two disjuncts in (δ),
and on the other hand, the bundle that goes with a1 ∧ b′1, namely the second of these two
disjuncts. This ”bundle character” of the normative consequence is not captured by (ε).
The analogue, in the present context, of the earlier Kanger–Lindahl construction dealing
with one F at a time, would be a construction connecting (ε) rather than (δ) to a1 as
normative consequence, since in (ε) the qi are distributed over the conjuncts and can be
dealt with one at a time. As just shown, however, due to the ”bundle character” of the
normative consequence, such a construction is less informative.
7. Conclusion
The theme of this paper has been the representation of normative systems within the
algebraic theory of Boolean quasi-orderings, and the integration of normative positions
within such a representation. In the course of the investigation a number of theoretical tools
have been constructed for analysing various traits of normative systems. These tools divide
mainly into three groups. One group encompasses the general theory of Boolean quasi-
orderings and the models of this theory called condition implication structures (cis’s).
Another group is that of normative positions and the framework of normative position cis’s
(so-called np-cis’s). A third group, finally, is that of joinings, connections and couplings,
aimed at the analysis of different kinds of correlations between descriptive and normative
conditions.
35 A notable exception is the work of Marek Sergot, see in particular [20].
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The further development and full employment of the tools thus constructed is the task
for a more comprehensive work. As regards putative next steps in the research program,
however, some areas of interest can be hinted at. One area concerns the concepts of com-
pleteness and non-redundancy of a normative system or codex, an area closely related to
the work of Alchourrón and Bulygin. Another area concerns changes of a normative system
and the amplification of open systems. Still another problem area, dealt with specifically
in some of our earlier papers, concerns legal concept formation and so-called intermediate
concepts. Since, in our view, connections from descriptive to normative exhibit the kernel
of a normative system, the concept of connection is an important tool for all three areas.
Moreover, the distinction between various ways of connecting fragments of a normative
system (atoms to atoms, atoms to dual atoms etc.) can serve as well for classification of
different kinds of norms.
Further development of the theory of normative positions in the Kanger–Lindahl tradi-
tion has been accomplished by other scholars, in particular Sergot and Jones. A particular
line of research concerns how the complex systems thus constructed can be incorporated
within the framework for normative systems proposed by us. Part of this problem is the fur-
ther development of the concept of an np-cis. Another part, however, is clarifying how the
analysis of normative positions is related to the three problem areas concerning normative
systems. As appears from the preceding sections, it is our belief that the representation of
normative positions should be pursued as part of the representation of normative systems.
Acknowledgements
Our paper is part of a project supported by the Swedish Council for Research in the
Humanities and Social Sciences (project F1113/97).36 Lars Lindahl’s work was performed
while he upheld a fellowship at the Swedish Collegium for Advanced Study in the Social
Sciences (SCASSS).
References
[1] C.E. Alchourrón, E. Bulygin, Normative Systems, Springer, Berlin, 1971.
[2] J.L. Bell, A.B. Slomson, Models and Ultraproducts: An Introduction, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1969.
[3] C.C. Chang, H.J. Keisler, Model Theory, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1973.
[4] A.J.I. Jones, M. Sergot, On the Characterization of Law and Computer Systems: The Normative Systems
Perspective, in: J-J.Ch. Meyer, R.J. Wieringa (Eds.), Deontic Logic in Computer Science, Wiley, New York,
1993.
[5] A.J.I. Jones, M. Sergot, A formal characterization of institutionalized power, J. IGPL 4 (1996) 429–445.
[6] S. Kanger, New foundations for ethical theory, Part 1 (1957), in: G. Holmström-Hintikka, et al. (Eds.),
Collected Papers of Stig Kanger With Essays on His Life and Work, vol. 1, Kluwer, Dordrecht, 2001,
pp. 99–119.
36 The paper, as well as our earlier joint papers, are the result of wholly joint work where the order of appear-
ance of our author names has no significance.
L. Lindahl, J. Odelstad / Journal of Applied Logic 2 (2004) 63–91 91
[7] S. Kanger, Rättighetsbegreppet (The Concept of a Right), in: Sju Filosofiska Studier tillägnade Anders Wed-
berg den 30 mars 1963, Philosophical Studies, Department of Philosophy, University of Stockholm, No 9,
1963, Reprinted, in English translation, as the first part of [8].
[8] S. Kanger, H. Kanger, Rights and parliamentarism, Theoria 32 (1966) 85–116.
[9] L. Lindahl, Position and Change: A Study in Law and Logic, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1977.
[10] L. Lindahl, J. Odelstad, Grounds and consequences in conceptual systems, in: S. Lindström, et al. (Eds.),
Odds and Ends: Philosophical Essays Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz on the Occasion of His Fiftieth
Birthday, Philosophical Studies, Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, 1996.
[11] L. Lindahl, J. Odelstad, Intermediate concepts as couplings of conceptual structures, in: P. McNamara, H.
Prakken (Eds.), Norms, Logics and Information Systems, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 1999.
[12] L. Lindahl, J. Odelstad, Normative systems: Core and amplifications, in: R. Sliwinski (Ed.), Philosophical
Crumbs. Essays Dedicated to Ann-Mari Henschen-Dahlquist on the Occasion of Her Seventy-Fifth Birthday,
Philosophical Studies, Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, 1999.
[13] L. Lindahl, J. Odelstad, An algebraic analysis of normative systems, Ratio Juris 13 (2000) 261–278.
[14] D. Makinson, On the formal representation of rights relations. Remarks on the Work of Stig Kanger and
Lars Lindahl, J. Philos. Logic 15 (1986) 403–425.
[15] D. Makinson, L. van der Torre, Input/output logic, J. Philos. Logic 29 (2000) 383–408.
[16] D. Makinson, L. van der Torre, Constraints for input/output logic, J. Philos. Logic 30 (2001) 155–185.
[17] J. Odelstad, L. Lindahl, Conceptual structures as Boolean orderings, in: L. Lindahl, et al. (Eds.), Not Without
Cause. Philosophical Essays Dedicated to Paul Needham on the Occasion of His Fiftieth Birthday, Philo-
sophical Studies, Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University, Uppsala, 1998.
[18] J. Odelstad, L. Lindahl, Normative systems represented by Boolean quasi-orderings, Nordic J. Philos.
Logic 5 (2000) 161–174.
[19] M.J. Sergot, Normative Positions, in: P. McNamara, H. Prakken (Eds.), Norms, Logics and Information
Systems, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 1999.
[20] M.J. Sergot, A computational theory of normative positions, ACM Trans. Comput. Logic (TOCL) 2 (2001)
581–622.
